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Abstract: One of the most difficult aspects of persuading the public to support climate 
change policy is the lack of recognition that climate change will likely have a direct impact 
on an individual’s life. Anecdotal evidence and arguments within the media suggest that 
those who are skeptical of climate change are more likely to believe that the negative 
externalities associated with climate change will be experienced by others, and, therefore, 
are not a concern to that individual. This project examines public perceptions of the health 
risk posed by climate change. Using a large national public opinion survey of adults in the 
United States, respondents were asked to evaluate the health risk for themselves, their 
community, the United States, and the world. The results suggest that individuals evaluate 
the risk for each of these contexts differently. Statistical analyses are estimated to identify 
the determinants of each risk perception to identify their respective differences. The 
implications of these findings on support for climate change policy are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Countless pages have been dedicated to lamenting the lack of public support for greenhouse gas 
abatement policies within the United States (US). Without public support, there is little incentive for 
elected officials, particularly those in highly competitive districts, to pursue such climate policies.  
A seemingly exponentially growing body of research has dedicated itself to pursuing answers for this 
lack of support. While these studies have approached this important topic from a variety of avenues,  
the research on risk perceptions seems particularly promising. 
In simplest terms, if an individual does not perceive any risk associated with an issue, there is little 
reason to alter the status quo to address a non-issue. Research is finding that risk perceptions directly 
influence climate policy support or opposition [1,2] and an individual’s willingness to overcome the 
collective action problem to become active in environmental causes [3]. Risk perceptions have similar 
effects on a number of other complex issue domains [4–6]. 
This project seeks to understand the extent to which risk perceptions might be influenced by 
familiarity and geo-spatial considerations. In other words, to what extent will an individual’s evaluation 
of risk change as the unit analyzed is scaled up to become much larger and less familiar to the individual? 
Relying upon in-group/out-group bias theory and optimism bias, which is quite consistent with various 
risk studies, we outline why we anticipate that individuals evaluate risk differently based upon familiarity 
and spatial considerations. 
Climate change poses many different risks. We focus on the health risks associated with climate 
change. Will the public view the health risks associated with climate change differently when evaluating 
this risk in terms of their family, community, the US in general, and the world? If there is a meaningful 
difference in these evaluations, what predicts these differences? The subsequent statistical analyses 
reveal that the public does perceive health risks differently based upon the spatial level evaluated and 
that the determinants of these perceptions differ in important and meaningful ways. The implications of 
these findings on the ability to legislate on climate change are discussed. 
1.1. Familiarity and Spatial Evaluations 
To understand why people perceive the health risk of climate change differently for themselves as 
opposed to their communities, country, and the world, it is helpful to examine in-group bias theory.  
In-group bias provides evidence that individuals are more persuaded by their “groups”. Out-group 
members have less influence in opinion formation. Psychological research on the in-group/out-group 
bias examines whether individuals inside of a group are more likely to be more supportive of members 
of their own group than outsiders [7]. This in-group/out-group bias has been found to influence a number 
of characteristics related to social identity and self-interest [8]. 
In-group/out-group theory makes the case that individuals are more sympathetic or persuaded by 
people they perceive to be like them. For our purposes, there is a large body of literature that suggests 
that there is a spatial component to in-group bias, which reflects an individual being more likely to 
evaluate individuals from their own country or community differently than those who are not members 
of those groups. For example, Lindholm and Christianson found that Swedish students were more likely 
to mistakenly identify an innocent immigrant than they were to mistakenly identify an innocent Swede 
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as the perpetrator during a line-up [9]. Additionally, Chiasson et al. asked French Canadian students to 
rank eight ethnically diverse persons in terms of likability [10]. Students ranked the people that looked 
the most similar to them as more likable. Lee and Ottati provide further evidence of this bias when they 
determined that Mexican citizens were more likely than US citizens to grant illegal Mexican immigrants 
privileges associated with US citizenship [11]. Basically, the argument that the local is more influential 
than the outsider is consistently reinforced by the scientific community [7,10–18]. 
While the above studies illustrate the in-group bias rooted in ethnic and cultural differences related 
to spatial scaling, a similarly robust body of literature has examined the dynamics of in-group bias  
within a community. In particular, this line of research has emphasized the importance of familiarity on 
in-group bias. For example, Schruijer et al. found that members of the Italian Communist Party were 
more sympathetic when members of their own party were involved in an altercation [18]. In an extreme 
example, this in-group bias has even been found to influence attitudes regarding the level of punishment 
assigned to in-group members convicted of sexual violence [14]. 
While familiarity can result in disproportionate favoritism toward members of one’s group, research 
suggests that more frequent interactions can reduce, or even eliminate, the out-group bias. For example, 
Lei and Vesely looked at in-group bias in income inequality [19]. They found that rich in-group members 
trusted other rich members more than they trusted the poor. Interestingly, the poor in-group was less 
discriminatory to their rich out-group and, with experience, ultimately trusted them more than their own. 
The poor group in this study found legitimacy in the status structure of the experiment, which mitigated 
their in-group bias. 
Though rarely linked in this manner, the literature exploring the reduction of in-group/out-group 
tensions is similar to social contact theory. The basics of social contact theory rely upon the idea that  
the more frequently members of different groups interact, the more these members will realize that  
the perceived differences between the groups are less severe than the members originally thought [20]. 
This literature consistently finds that greater levels of exposure between members of out-groups reduce 
the perceptions of differences between these groups [21]. 
Furthermore, studies suggest that self-interest and self-definitions are related to perceptions of an 
individual’s social identity [8,22]. These social identities are directly related to the in-group/out-group 
bias, where the group one associates most strongly with helps define an individual’s self-categorizations 
and behaviors [8]. In turn, this familiarity with one’s group influences an individual’s perception of  
self-interest through a process called self-anchoring [23]. In short, the literature increasingly indicates 
that individuals’ self-identities directly relate to their collective identity, or in-group [24], and that the 
greater their familiarity and interaction with their in-group, the greater the connection of the group’s 
interest to their self-interest [25]. What is interesting about this process is that individuals can manage 
the cognitive dissonance that is created by the desire to conform to the group with their desire to be an 
individual [26,27], which is why it can be difficult to separate self-interest from this in-group bias. 
Additionally, a recent study illustrates that when individuals have a purpose to which they are committed, 
which is often associated with or defined by their collective identity, the more likely they will be to  
self-assess higher levels of well-being and a positive outlook toward life [28]. This is likely related to the 
optimism bias, which will be discussed below (This discussion is important because some might worry 
that these evaluations are actually reflections of self-interest, and not necessarily in-group/out-group bias. 
As the psychological literature indicates, one’s understanding of self-interest is connected to one’s 
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collective identify, or in-group bias, which suggests that an in-group bias approach to this examination 
is the most appropriate approach). 
For our purposes, these bodies of literature illustrates the mitigating role that familiarity plays in 
reducing the unknowns between groups, while also recognizing that spatial differences actively divide 
the public. This results in two basic expectations. First, the spatial dynamics of the in-group bias indicate 
that an individual will be less familiar with groups that are further away from their local area, which will 
increase perceptions of differences between groups and decrease the connection to self-interest. Second, 
despite the potential in-group/out-group friction, individuals will have greater interaction with members 
of their own community, and clearly their family, than members of the global or nation-wide group. The 
mitigating influence of these interactions should cause individuals to view their community and their 
family differently than they view the entire country or the world. Together, these expectations suggest 
that individuals would view the health risk associated with climate change differently for the in-group 
(i.e., themselves and their families or their local community) than the out-group (the entire US or the 
world). Furthermore, recognizing the importance of familiarity in this process, we expect that there will 
be differences in evaluations of the health risks within both the in-group and out-group. For example, 
individuals living in the US will likely be more familiar with the US than the world, despite that fact that 
they should be less familiar with both of these when compared to their family or community (the same 
applies for the difference between their family and their community). Therefore, there is reason to 
believe that the predictors of the health risks for each of these groups should differ. 
1.2. Health and Risk 
This project will focus its attention on the perceptions of health risk caused by climate change. Recent 
research has consistently found that risk perceptions predict public policy preferences [1,2,4,5,29]. 
Indeed, Stoutenborough et al. argued that the connection between risk and public policy is relatively 
straightforward, as “those who perceive the risk associated with something as high should be more likely 
to oppose policies that would increase that risk, and, conversely, support policies that decrease this  
risk” [6]. In terms of health risks, if an individual does not perceive the risk to be high, there is no reason 
to expect that they will support a policy that would reduce these risks. (A definition of “health risk” was 
not given to respondents. They were left to define health risk as they perceived it). 
However, psychological studies into risk perceptions suggest that risk is a component of four 
characteristics—likelihood, severity, magnitude of harm, and level of understanding [30]. These four 
components directly link to one’s knowledge, as each of these evaluations is contingent upon what is 
known about the specific risk scenario. For example, individuals who drive the same route to work every 
day should be better able to evaluate the likelihood of getting in an accident than an individual that has 
never driven that route. 
The lynchpin for this evaluation of risk is the level of understanding, particularly for a complex issue. 
If an issue is complex, individuals are less likely to have a very strong understanding of the problem. 
Consequently, they have to rely more heavily on experts. If they do not believe that experts understand 
the problem, they are more likely to perceive risk. In terms of health risk, this level of understanding 
should be greater for groups with which an individual is most familiar. In other words, an individual 
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should be better prepared to evaluate the health risk for their family and their community than for the 
US or world simply because these groups are more familiar to the individual. 
Essentially, these perceptions are spatially dependent, which directly links to the above discussion on 
in-group/out-group theory. For example, the risk of rising sea levels will be greatest along the coasts, 
while lowest in the mountains. Studies indicate that the public recognizes this spatial component, as 
those living further away from a coast are less likely to view this risk as being high [31]. If an individual 
is most familiar with that which is proximate, then they should be less familiar with groups the further 
away they are located. Consequently, an individual should be better able to evaluate the health risk of 
climate change the more proximate the group being evaluated. 
When examining how individuals perceive risk toward others, we must first look at how individuals 
perceive personal risk. Another line of scholarship suggests that risk perceptions are often affected by 
“dramatic media presentations, controllability, catastrophic potential, equity, uncertainty and threat to 
future generations” [32]. In other words, as individuals see that potential threats are uncontrollable and 
there is uncertainty of outcomes, risk perceptions tend to increase. 
Based on this literature, we argue that risk perceptions toward others can be affected by two main 
elements: uncontrollability and uncertainty. Several scholars have noted that if individuals feel that 
outcomes are beyond their control, risk perceptions increase [32,33]. Therefore, as individuals evaluate 
how potential threats may affect individuals outside of their group, they likely see the situation as out of 
their control and thus have elevated risk perceptions toward others. 
Uncertainty of outcomes is another factor that drives risk perception. Uncertainty has been defined 
as “a lack of sure knowledge about the course of past, present, future, or hypothetical events” [34]  
(p. 41). Uncertainty likely increases as individuals evaluate the health risks of those outside their group 
and especially for those who are not proximate. Thus, as the uncertainty of outcomes increases, so does 
the risk perception for those who are outside one’s family, community, or country. 
Finally, scholars have continued to find an optimism bias when it comes to accurate risk perceptions, 
especially when it comes to health risks [35,36]. For example, Weinstein found that individuals tend to 
over-estimate the likelihood of positive events and under-estimate the likelihood of negative events 
occurring in their lives [36], which is consistent with the Sumner et al. study discussed above [28]. These 
studies suggest that optimism bias may directly relate to in-group bias. The tendency for this to occur is 
in part linked with controllability as participants in this study tended to believe that they have more 
control over their own outcomes while not recognizing that others may have the same abilities to control 
their outcomes [36]. This and similar findings have lead scholars to hypothesize that this optimism is 
associated with an “illusion of control” [37,38]. 
In this same vein, other scholars have noted that individuals not only overestimate positive events for 
themselves, but they overestimate negative outcomes for others [35]. In their study, which examined risk 
perceptions toward being diagnosed with skin cancer, the authors noted that, “people are more ready to 
accept that others are at risk than they are themselves” [35]. Harris and Middleton found similar results 
when they asked student respondents to evaluate risks of a variety of health issues for themselves and 
the “typical student,” noting that students evaluated their health risks as significantly lower than  
others [37]. 
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Based on previous scholarship on in-group/out-group dynamics, risk perception, and optimism bias, 
we expect that individuals will perceive the health risks associated with global climate change differently 
when considering themselves and their families, their communities, their country, and the world. 
2. Analytical Strategy 
We intend to examine this issue from two perspectives. First, does the public differentiate between 
the health risks associated with climate change based on spatial differences. Second, if there is a 
difference, what predicts these differences in risk perceptions? We approach this from four different 
spatial positions. 
To answer these questions, we utilize the Institute of Science, Technology and Public Policy (ISTPP) 
National Climate Change Survey from 2013. Administered by GfK Custom Research, LLC, the survey 
was in the field from 13 November 2013, through 26 November 2013. A total of 1321 respondents 
participated in the survey. The sample was from KnowlegePanel®, a probability-based web panel 
designed to be representative of U.S. adults age 18 and older. The survey was offered in English and 
targeted toward adults over the age of 18. In the U.S., adults age 18 and older are eligible to vote, which 
makes this the most appropriate population to study. 
Four dependent variables are derived from a battery of questions related to perceptions of the risk 
associated with climate change on health. Respondents were presented with the following question stem, 
“Indicate the level of risk posed by global warming and climate change to the health of the following 
groups.” Risk was evaluated along an 11-point scale. The groups were, (1) “you and your family”;  
(2) “your community”; (3) “the US”; and (4) “the world”. Each of these were coded from 0 to 10, with 
0 representing “very low risk” and 10 indicating “very high risk”. 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of individual perceptions of the health risk caused by climate change 
by group. This illustration suggests that there will be a significant difference in risk between the US and 
world groups and all of the others. It is unclear whether there will be a difference between the you and 
your family group and the community group. To examine our first research question, we will analyze 
these groups using simple paired t-tests. A paired t-test allows us to determine whether there is a 
statistically significant difference between the means of each group. Based on Figure 1, we anticipate 
that there will be a difference for every pairing except, perhaps, the you and your family group and the 
community group. 
Based on the distributions in Figure 1, we believe it is safe to explain how we intend to examine  
our second research question, which seeks to understand the determinants of these differences in risk 
perceptions. Due to the noncontinuous, ordered nature of the data, an ordered logit is an appropriate 
analytical approach to examine the data [39]. One common concern with ordered data is the empty bin 
problem [40]. The empty bin problem is when there is an insufficient number of observations in the 
ordered categories, which results in first-order estimation errors (e.g., no females reporting a health risk 
value of 3 for the world), which will result in biased standard errors and coefficient estimates. This 
concern is particularly relevant given we operationalize a dependent variable with 11 ordered categories. 
An easy test of the empty bin problem is to run a Brant Test following an ordered logit. If the Brant Test 
is unable to estimate, this indicates that there is a significant empty bin problem. Fortunately, we were 
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able to estimate a Brant Test for each of our models, which suggests that the ordered categories for each 
group are sufficiently populated. 
Note: The frequencies are based on the question, “Indicate the level of risk posed by global warming and 
climate change to the health of the following groups.” The four groups were (1) “You and your family”;  
(2) “Your community”; (3) “The US”; and (4) “The world”. 
Figure 1. Perceptions of the health risk caused by climate change by geographical group. 
Examinations of public opinion on climate change issues frequently identify various attitudes, risk 
perceptions, trust evaluations, measurements of knowledge, and demographics that influence these 
opinions [2,41–43]. The ISTPP National Climate Change Survey includes several such measures, which 
are integrated into the ordered logit models. We include three measures of risk, two of trust, two attitudes, 
a measure of knowledge, and seven demographic characteristics (Variable summaries and definitions 
can be found in Appendix). 
Attitudes can be powerful drivers of behavior. Tversky and Kahneman suggested that “when faced with 
a complex problem, people employ a variety of heuristic procedures in order to simplify the representation 
and evaluation of prospects” [44]. Previous examinations of risk perceptions related to climate change 
reveal a strong influence of two particular attitudes, ecological values, and efficacy [41,45]. The ISTPP 
National Climate Change Survey included several questions measuring climate change efficacy, where 
respondents were asked to evaluate how their actions influence climate change. These variables were indexed 
to create a single efficacy measure (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.8325). Stoutenborough and Vedlitz argued, “Those 
with greater efficacy should be more aware of their impact on the environment, which should cause them to 
be more concerned about environmental issues” [45]. Therefore, we anticipate that those who have greater 
climate change efficacy will perceive a greater health risk caused by climate change. 
Similarly, measures of ecological values have been strong predictors of various climate change 
attitudes and beliefs [2,31,41,45]. The ISTPP National Climate Change Survey included a commonly 
used abbreviated version [41] of the New Ecological Paradigm developed by Dunlap et al. [46]. The 
measure of ecological values is an index of seven questions (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.8327). The extant 
literature clearly indicates that those with stronger ecological values will be more likely to perceive 
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climate change risk and support climate policy. Consequently, we anticipate that those with stronger 
ecological values will be more likely to perceive a health risk. 
Although it may seem odd to test the predictive power of risk perceptions on a perception of health 
risk, we believe these baseline perceptions are essential. Specifically, we examine the influence of 
general risk perceptions about climate change, the environment, and health care. We anticipate that those 
who are more concerned about climate change will believe that the health risk associated with climate 
change will be higher. Similarly, those who are more concerned with health care should be more likely 
to believe that the health risk will be higher. Finally, those who are more concerned about the environment 
should be more likely to express higher levels of health risk. Though two of these measures seem very 
similar to the dependent variable, the specificity of the dependent variable causes them to be different. 
For example, an individual may be concerned about climate change, but only from the perspective that 
it might cause sea levels to rise, which may not be connected to health issues for that individual. 
Similarly, an individual may be concerned about health care because of inadequate access to quality 
care, which likely is not influenced by health risks caused by climate change. These risk perceptions 
capture preexisting perceptions about their respective issue domains. 
We also include two measures of trust: trust in government and trust in scientists. Previous research 
suggests that those who trust scientists are more likely to perceive higher levels of climate change risk [45] 
because those who trust scientists should be more likely to believe the scientific consensus that climate 
change is occurring and that this will cause any number of negative impacts on humans. Simply, those 
who do not trust scientists are less likely to believe that climate change is real, which should decrease 
their perception of any potential health risks associated with climate change. Conversely, when things 
go wrong, we turn to the government to fix the problem. With this in mind, we suspect that those who 
trust the US government should be less likely to perceive health risks associated with climate change 
because they expect the government to prevent any such risk. 
Extant research also illustrates the importance of knowledge on evaluations of risk and other  
climate attitudes [45]. As the risk literature consistently finds, knowledge-related issues predict risk 
perceptions [30,47,48]. Thus, those who are knowledgeable are better able to evaluate risk. In the current 
study, we anticipate that knowledge will have a different predictive power based on the group evaluated. 
We expect that those who are more knowledgeable will perceive lower health risks for the you and your 
family group and the community group, as they will be much more knowledgeable of their surroundings 
and the localized threat of a health risk due to climate change. However, the larger the group, the more 
difficult it is to evaluate this risk, as familiarity with the specifics of these groups dwindles. Consequently, 
we expect that those with more knowledge will perceive greater health risks for the US and the world. 
Finally, studies of public opinion on climate issues consistently illustrate the importance of controlling for 
the influence of demographic indicators [3,42]. Specifically, we control for the influence of gender, income, 
marital status, political ideology, party identification, education, and age. Unfortunately, predicting the 
specific directionality of these relationships has proven difficult, as demographic indicators have been shown 
to be inconsistent predictors of climate policy, even when using the same survey data [2]. Due to this lack 
of consistency, we operate under the simple expectation that demographic indicators may predict 
perceptions of health risk. 
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3. Results 
We begin with an examination of our first research question, which asked whether the public viewed 
the health risk associated with climate change differently depending upon the contextual differences for 
each evaluation. As indicated in Figure 1, there was reason to believe that the public differed in their 
evaluations based upon the geographical group. However, it is possible that these perceived differences 
were statistically no different from one another. 
We estimated paired t-tests for each combination of groups. These results are presented in Table 1. 
As the results indicate, there is a statistically significant difference between all of the groupings, except 
the you and your family group and the community group. Although the community group did have a 
larger mean, the difference fell short of an accepted level of statistical significance. Overall, we find 
support for our first research question, as only one of the six combinations of groups was not significantly 
different from one another. These results suggest that we should find similar predictors for the you and 
your family group and the community group, while different predictors should determine health risk 
assessments for the US and world, which should differ from one another as well. 
Table 1. Comparison of Health Risk Means. 
 n Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation 
You and Your Family 1296 4.837 0.078 2.833 
Community 1298 5.006 0.077 2.808 
Difference  −0.169 0.110  
You and Your Family 1296 4.837 0.078 2.833 
US 1298 5.909 0.076 2.774 
Difference  −1.072 *** 0.110  
You and Your Family 1296 4.837 0.078 2.833 
World 1284 6.560 0.080 2.871 
Difference  −1.723 *** 0.112  
Community 1298 5.006 0.077 2.808 
US 1298 5.909 0.076 2.774 
Difference  −0.903 *** 0.109  
Community 1298 5.006 0.077 2.808 
World 1284 6.560 0.080 2.871 
Difference  −1.554 *** 0.111  
US 1298 5.909 0.076 2.774 
World 1284 6.560 0.080 2.871 
Difference  −0.651 *** 0.111  
Note: Paired t-tests. All comparisons test to determine if the means are significantly different from 0.  
Ha: Difference ≠ 0. * p<0.050, ** p<0.010, *** p<0.001. 
The second research question concerned the identification of the determinants of health risk 
perceptions. The results of each of the four analyses are all presented in Table 2 to better enable 
comparisons among the models. All four models were estimated with robust standard errors to combat 
heteroskedasticity, and each performs quite well. 
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Table 2. Determinants of the Health Risk caused by Climate Change by Geographical Group. 
 You and Your Family Community United States World 
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
Risk         
Climate Change 0.223 (0.039) 0.000 0.224 (0.039) 0.000 0.230 (0.040) 0.000 0.227 (0.036) 0.000 
Environment 0.026 (0.042) 0.533 0.054 (0.041) 0.193 0.071 (0.042) 0.089 0.093 (0.039) 0.018 
Health Care 0.048 (0.028) 0.088 0.044 (0.027) 0.102 0.019 (0.028) 0.492 −0.011 (0.029) 0.707 
Trust         
Government 0.129 (0.084) 0.129 0.117 (0.083) 0.161 0.070 (0.086) 0.415 0.009 (0.085) 0.908 
Scientists 0.023 (0.005) 0.000 0.023 (0.005) 0.000 0.034 (0.005) 0.000 0.038 (0.005) 0.000 
Attitudes         
Ecological Values 0.348 (0.109) 0.001 0.389 (0.109) 0.000 0.585 (0.109) 0.000 0.701 (0.111) 0.000 
Efficacy 0.639 (0.110) 0.000 0.665 (0.104) 0.000 0.663 (0.104) 0.000 0.564 (0.108) 0.000 
Knowledge −0.732 (0.331) 0.027 −0.663 (0.323) 0.040 −0.684 (0.337) 0.043 −0.158 (0.328) 0.630 
Demographics         
Age −0.009 (0.03) 0.009 −0.009 (0.003) 0.005 −0.011 (0.003) 0.001 −0.009 (0.003) 0.014 
Female 0.044 (0.111) 0.691 0.037 (0.113) 0.742 0.181 (0.118) 0.123 0.165 (0.119) 0.169 
Education −0.090 (0.027) 0.001 −0.071 (0.026) 0.007 −0.062 (0.026) 0.020 −0.056 (0.028) 0.045 
Married 0.172 (0.126) 0.173 0.121 (0.128) 0.343 0.069 (0.128) 0.590 −0.032 (0.127) 0.797 
Party Identification −0.094 (0.034) 0.007 −0.089 (0.034) 0.010 −0.103 (0.036) 0.005 −0.082 (0.036) 0.025 
Political Ideology 0.069 (0.052) 0.187 0.065 (0.051) 0.200 0.063 (0.053) 0.234 0.044 (0.053) 0.405 
Income −0.026 (0.014) 0.077 −0.035 (0.015) 0.020 −0.022 (0.015) 0.144 −0.018 (0.016) 0.257 
Cut Point 1 −0.782 (0.500)  −0.624 (0.491)  −0.759 (0.494)  −0.486 (0.508)  
Cut Point 2 −0.070 (0.492)  0.110 (0.487)  −0.041 (0.489)  0.043 (0.502)  
Cut Point 3 0.672 (0.491)  0.867 (0.485)  0.650 (0.491)  0.780 (0.498)  
Cut Point 4 1.333 (0.489)  1.536 (0.486)  1.286 (0.490)  1.305 (0.501)  
Cut Point 5 1.800 (0.488)  2.106 (0.486)  1.891 (0.488)  1.915 (0.499)  
Cut Point 6 2.933 (0.491)  3.247 (0.492)  3.056 (0.495)  3.017 (0.507)  
Cut Point 7 3.694 (0.496)  3.991 (0.499)  3.841 (0.501)  3.553 (0.512)  
Cut Point 8 4.524 (0.504)  4.894 (0.510)  4.809 (0.507)  4.385 (0.520)  
Cut Point 9 5.223 (0.511)  5.637 (0.518)  5.923 (0.518)  5.499 (0.532)  
Cut Point 10 5.803 (0.519)  6.238 (0.526)  6.776 (0.526)  6.455 (0.542)  
Number of Cases 1047  1049  1052  1037  
Wald Chi2 535.71 0.0000 5790.29 0.0000 7380.16 0.0000 6450.61 0.0000 
Count R2 0.253  0.271  0.275  0.309  
Log Pseudolikelihood −2110.2809  −2093.2736  −1997.663  −1894.1244  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test. 
We begin with the analysis of the group that each respondent has the most familiarity with—you and 
your family. The model is able to correctly predict 25.3% of the cases, which represents a 178% 
improvement over random chance (9.09%). With 11 potential outcomes, this is a strong indicator that 
the model is quite robust. The analysis reveals that those who are more concerned about climate change 
and health care were more likely to perceive higher levels of health risk due to climate change. 
Additionally, those who trust scientists, and have stronger ecological values, greater efficacy, and less 
knowledge were more likely to report higher levels of health risk. Finally, four demographic indicators 
predict health risk perceptions for the you and your family group. Specifically, those who are older in 
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age, more educated, more strongly associated with the Republican Party, and those with higher incomes 
were less likely to perceive a health risk. 
Turning our attention to the evaluations of the health risk to an individual’s community, we find that 
the model is able to correctly predict 27.1% of the cases, which is a 198% improvement over chance. As 
noted above, given the insignificant difference with the you and your family group, we expected that the 
same variables would predict the community group. However, the analysis reveals that an individual’s 
concern about health care is no longer a predictor. There are no substantively important variations among 
the rest of the variables. This suggests that the small difference between the means may have been related 
to the connection between concern for health care and the community. This, when combined with the 
previous model, suggests that evaluations of general concern for health care were likely based on 
personal concerns (e.g., the cost or quality of coverage), and not broad-based concerns (differences in 
the quality of care depending upon where one lives—rural/urban, wealthy region/poor region, etc.). 
The results in Table 1 suggest that the determinants for health risk will be different when we examine 
them from the perspective of the US. These results indicate that this expectation was correct. This 
analysis also performs well, correctly predicting 27.5% of the cases, which is a 202% improvement over 
chance. The analysis indicates that those who are more concerned with climate change, more concerned 
with the environment, trust scientists, have stronger ecological values, are more efficacious, and less 
knowledgeable were more likely to perceive a higher health risk due to climate change. We anticipated 
that knowledge would lead to predictions in the opposite direction, as an individual who is truly 
knowledgeable should know that there are many potential health risks for many different regions of the 
US [49]. It is also worth highlighting that the less proximate the group, the stronger the influence of  
broad-based risks on attitudes. Specifically, we find that concern for the environment predicted health 
risks, but health care had very little impact. This, again, suggests that concern for health care is driven by 
personal concerns. Finally, the models also reveal that those who are older in age, more educated, and 
more strongly associated with the Republican Party were less likely to perceive a health risk. An 
individual’s income is no longer a predictor when the geographical group is expanded to the entire country. 
The final model evaluates an individual’s perception of the health risk for the world. The model 
correctly predicts 30.9% of the cases, which is a 239% improvement over chance. As noted, we expected 
that the determinants for this model would differ from the previous three because the mean level of 
health risk was significantly higher than all of the others. The analysis indicates that this expectation is 
supported. The model reveals that the predictors of the US group are similar to those of the world, except 
that knowledge is no longer a predictor. While this is still not what we anticipated, an insignificant 
knowledge measure does indicate that those with more knowledge are able to consider the nuance of 
these issues, as this is the only model where knowledge is not a significant, negative indicator. 
Additionally, concern for the environment is a much stronger predictor in this model, which suggests 
that concern for the environment stems from a more broad-based perspective, not a local. 
It can be difficult to ascertain exactly what coefficient estimates, robust standard errors, and p-values 
really mean when estimating an ordered logit model. It is often easier to interpret these results through 
an illustration [50]. Simulated distributions represent the expected distribution of health risk perceptions 
for the respective variables. These simulations are based on predicted probabilities, which held each of 
the other variables in the model constant at its median. Consequently, these distributions represent the 
“average” person as the specifics of each respective variable changes. The predicted probabilities were 
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used to estimate the expected distribution for 1000 responses for each of the distributions. Given the 
number of variables and models estimated, there are far too many potential distributions to illustrate. For 
parsimonious reasons, we will highlight a few to provide a substantive interpretation for several of the 
above statistically significant relationships. 
To illustrate the power of some of these predictors, we will highlight the influence of ecological 
values and efficacy in the community model. Recall, both variables are measured on a 0 to 4 scale, and 
both were strong predictors of health risk. However, as Figure 2 illustrates, efficacy has a substantially 
stronger influence on health risk perceptions than ecological values, though ecological values are still 
very strong. To simplify the presentation of these simulated distributions, we only present three values 
for each of the dependent variables (the highest, lowest and middle). These sufficiently illustrate how 
changes to these variables influence an individual’s response to the health risk caused by climate change. 
The simulation for the community group predicts that, out of 1000 respondents with efficacy equal to 0 
(the lowest possible score), we expect to find seven respondents view the health risk as a 10 (the highest 
level of risk possible). However, by the time efficacy increases to 4 (the highest possible score), the 
simulation predicts that 98 respondents would report a health risk at 10. This represents a 1300% increase 
(Similarly, you and your family increased 1150%, the US increased 1256%, and the world increased 
714%). Conversely, out of 1000 respondents with ecological values equal to 0 (the lowest possible 
score), we expect to find 14 respondents view the health risk as a 10. When ecological values rise to 4 
(the highest possible value), the simulation predicts this rate will increase to 65. Though important, this 
only represents a 364% increase. Finally, another way to understand the relative impact of changes to a 
variable is to examine shifts in the mode of the predicted distribution. When both variables are set to 0, 
the predicted mode for both is 5 for health risk. When both variables increase to 4, the mode for efficacy 
increases to be 7, while the mode for ecological values remains at 5. Although, ecological values is 
clearly having an important impact on perceptions of health risks within one’s community, it is not 
having as powerful an influence as efficacy. 
Simulations were also estimated on the ordered logit examining health risks for the world, as 
visualized in Figure 3. This time, we estimated simulations for the three statistically significant variables 
that were each measured on a 0 to 10 scale. Although all three are statistically significant, they clearly 
have different influences on perceptions of health risk. For example, the simulation predicts that, out of 
1000 respondents with a climate change risk perception equal to 0 (the lowest possible perception of 
risk), we anticipate that only 27 would report a health risk of 10. When climate change risk increases to 
10 (the highest possible value), we expect to find that 216 (or more than one out of every five individuals) 
would report a health risk value of 10. This represents a 700% increase in health risk. In comparison, the 
simulation for environmental risk predicted 48 and 114, respectively—a 137% increase. Furthermore, 
the simulation for trust in scientists predicted 44 and 64, respectively—a 45% increase. Finally, when 
the values for all three variables are set to 0, the mode health risk is 5. Conversely, when all three 
variables increase to 10, the mode for the trust in scientists variable is 7, while the modes for the two 
risk variables increase to 8. These represent substantial shifts in health risks. However, despite strong 
statistical significance, trust in scientists has a noticeably smaller substantive impact on health risk 
perceptions for the world. 
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Figure 2. Simulated Influence of ecological values and efficacy on health risk perceptions 
in the community group.  
 
Figure 3. Simulated influence of trust in scientists, climate change risk, and environment 
risk on health risk perceptions in the world group.  
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Figure 4. Simulated influence of ecological values on health risk perceptions in all  
four groups.  
 
Figure 5. Simulated influence of climate change risk on health risk perceptions in all  
four groups.  
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to ecological values as we change the geographic group being evaluated in terms of health risk. This is 
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world), the simulations indicate that, out of 1000 respondents with an ecological values score of 0, we 
expect to find 16, 14, 11 and 15, respectively, would report a health risk value of 10. However, when 
ecological values increase to 4, we expect to find 64, 65, 108 and 210, respectively, would report a health 
risk of 10. These represent a 300% increase in the health risk perceptions in the you and your family 
model, a 364% increase in the community model, an 881% increase in the US model, and a 1300% 
increase in the world model. Finally, the mode health risk, when ecological values are 0, is 5 for all four 
groups. When ecological values increase to 4, the mode for the US and world groups shift to 8, with no 
change to the you and your family or community groups. These simulations suggest that ecological 
values are more likely to have a stronger influence on perceptions of health risk for geographical groups 
with which the individual is less familiar. Another way to think about this influence is that ecological 
values may be more big-picture in nature. 
Finally, we will compare the simulations for perceptions of climate change risk on the health risks 
for all four groups, presented in Figure 5. At first glance, the distributions in Figure 5 suggest that climate 
change risk had the biggest influence on perceptions of the health risk for the world, though it clearly 
has a strong influence in all four models. However, examining these distributions without the proper 
context would result in an incorrect assessment. Indeed, the influence of climate change risk is actually 
fairly consistent across all four models. Again, as the size of the group increases, the simulations indicate 
that, out of 1000 respondents with a climate change risk of 0, we expect to find 12, 12, 15 and 27, 
respectively, reporting a health risk of 10. When climate change risk increases to 10, we expect to find 
109, 104, 133 and 216, respectively, reporting a health risk of 10. These represent an 808% increase in 
the you and your family model, a 766% increase in the community model, a 786% increase in the US 
model, and a 700% increase in the world model. As noted, context is important, and the survey data 
suggest that the public is generally more concerned to begin with about the health risk associated with 
climate change at the global scale. While this simulated distribution is the highest, it also had the highest 
starting point. Finally, the mode health risk, when climate change risk is 0, is a 5. By the time climate 
change risk is increased to 10, the modes for you and your family and community are a 7, while the 
mode is 8 for the US and world models. These represent substantial shifts in health risk associated with 
changes in climate change risk. Regardless, these results suggest a fairly consistent impact for climate 
change risk. 
4. Discussion 
We began this project with the intent of understanding whether the public viewed the health risks 
caused by climate change differently based upon the group being evaluated. We outlined why we 
expected to find this relationship based upon in-group/out-group theory, optimism bias, the risk 
literature, and health literature. Several important implications are revealed. 
First, the public clearly does not recognize the potential butterfly effect that events in one area can 
have on others. The results of this analysis clearly indicate that the public is perceiving the health risks 
associated with climate change differently depending upon the spatial level evaluated. The more 
proximate the group evaluated, the less likely the individual is to perceive health risk. This is consistent 
with the way we expect familiarity, self-interest, and the optimism bias to influence these perceptions. 
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In particular, individuals are better able to understand and evaluate risk when they are more familiar with 
the group [51,52]. 
The policy implications of these findings are significant. This helps to explain the difficulty of 
convincing the public to support climate policy. If individuals do not believe that they will be personally 
affected by climate change, the literature suggests that they will be less likely to support policy. We find 
that the public is clearly less concerned about the health risks the more proximate the group evaluated. 
This suggests that campaigns in favor of climate policy need to focus on explaining the local threat of 
climate change on health. This is likely true for other climate-related issues, as well. Unfortunately, this 
will require many targeted campaigns, which will be more costly and time consuming. Furthermore, 
policy will have to try to address all of these specific conditions if it is to generate broad public support. 
Second, the analyses reveal that individuals rely upon more individualized heuristics when evaluating 
health risks to more proximate groups. While this is not particularly surprising given the optimism bias, 
we are unaware of extant research that reveals this relationship with climate change. Similarly, the less 
familiar individuals are with the group, the more they rely upon broad-based heuristics. These broad-based 
measures tap into core values and beliefs, which help an individual to evaluate the health risks associated 
with climate change when an individual is less familiar with the specifics of that group. 
Third, although the influence of knowledge did not perform as we anticipated, the results are 
consistent with theory. Those who are less knowledgeable are more likely to perceive a health risk to 
themselves and their family, their community, and to the US. This is consistent with the expectations 
outlined in the level of understanding component of risk. Although the literature generally assumes that 
evaluations of this level of understanding are based on expert understanding, it stands to reason that if 
individuals know that they do not understand a complex issue, like climate change, then they would 
perceive greater levels of risk. This, combined with the connection to the in-group, particularly for the 
family and community spatial levels, and with a lack of understanding, might cause an individual to be 
much more worried about the health risk caused by climate change. Similarly, Americans are well known 
to have some of the highest levels of national pride [53,54] and their belief in US exceptionalism [55,56], 
which suggests an inherent in-group bias, which is consistent with the studies finding meaningful 
differences in attitudes based on country of origin. The results suggest that while the public should not 
be as familiar with the entirety of the US, this national pride differentiates the effect of knowledge on 
perceptions of risk, making knowledge have a similar impact on the US as it does on more proximate 
groups. While the public views the risk to the world as being the greatest, the spatial level and lack of 
familiarity with the world mitigates the impact of knowledge, making those who are the most 
knowledgeable no different than those who are the least knowledgeable in their perceptions of the health 
risk caused by climate change. Additional research is needed to understand this relationship better. 
Finally, by comparing the four groupings, this analysis reveals the nuanced substantive impact that 
specific predictors can have on health risk perceptions. For example, even when coefficient estimates 
are fairly consistent across the four models, the substantive impacts can vary (e.g., Figure 5). Perhaps 
most importantly, as alluded to above, the substantive and predictive importance of these indicators can 
change rather drastically when applied to different spatial groupings. This suggests that respondents 
were tapping into slightly different mental models based on each grouping, which indicates that 
respondents were actively engaged during the evaluation of each group. The implications of these 
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nuanced findings suggest that there is still much we do not understand about public attitudes and 
perceptions regarding climate change. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable Definitions. 
Variable Operation 
Independent Variables 
Climate Change Risk 
Measured using an 11-point scale. Respondents were asked to indicate how 
concerned they considered themselves to be on the issue of global warming  
and climate change, with 10 = extremely concerned, and 0 = not at all concerned. 
Environment Risk 
Measured using an 11-point scale. Respondents were asked to indicate how 
concerned they considered themselves to be on the issue of the environment,  
with 10 = extremely concerned, and 0 = not at all concerned. 
Health Care Risk 
Measured using an 11-point scale. Respondents were asked to indicate how 
concerned they considered themselves to be on the issue of health care, with  
10 = extremely concerned, and 0 = not at all concerned. 
Trust Scientists 
Measured as an index that average respondent trust in scientists using an 11-point 
scale, where 0 represented the lowest value and 10 the highest. Respondents  
were asked to evaluate scientist competence and the extent to which they shared  
the respondent’s values. 
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Table A1. Cont. 
Variable Operation 
Independent Variables 
Efficacy 
Measured as an index that average respondent efficacy using a 5-point scale  
where 4 = strongly agree and 0 = strongly disagree, respondents were asked to state 
their agreement with (1) I believe my actions have little to no influence on global 
warming and climate change (note: This was reverse coded); (2) My actions to 
reduce the effects of global warming and climate change in my community will 
encourage others to reduce the effects of global warming through their own actions; 
(3) I have an obligation to future generations to reduce my impact on global 
warming and climate change; (4) I have a moral obligation to reduce my impact  
on global warming and climate change; (5) I have already taken steps to reduce my 
contribution to global warming and climate change. 
Ecological Values 
Measured as an index that average respondent ecological values using a 5-point 
scale where 4 = strongly agree and 0 = strongly disagree, respondents were asked  
to state their agreement with (1) We are approaching the limit of people the earth 
can support; (2) When humans interfere with nature it produces disastrous 
consequences; (3) Plants and animals have as much right to exist as humans;  
(4) The earth is like a spaceship with limited resources; (5) The balance of nature is 
easily upset; (6) If things continue on their present course, we will experience  
a major ecological catastrophe; and (7) Humans were meant to rule over the rest  
of nature (note: This was reverse coded). 
Knowledge 
Measures as the percentage of true/false knowledge questions correctly answered. 
(1) The major cause of increased atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases is 
human burning of fossil fuels; (2) Nitrous oxide is a greenhouse gas; (3) Aerosols 
are airborne particles that are known to contribute to the formation of clouds and 
precipitation; (4) The greenhouse effect refers to gases in the atmosphere that trap 
heat; (5) Climate often changes from year to year; (6) Ocean currents carry heat 
from the equator to the north and south poles; (6) The US emits the largest total 
amount of carbon dioxide per year; (7) The energy in fossil fuels originally came 
from the fossilized remains of plants and animals; (8) The average yearly 
temperature of the Earth’s surface is currently above 65 degrees Fahrenheit; and  
(9) The Earth’s climate is warmer now than it has ever been before. 
Trust Government 
Measured using a 4-point scale. Respondent were asked to indicate how much of 
the time they could trust the government in Washington to do what is right, with  
3 = just about always, and 0 = rarely. 
Female Measured nominally as 1 = female, and 0 = male. 
Income 
Measured as the estimated annual household income (19 ordered categories 
representing $5000 increments through $100,000 and $25,000 increments  
after that) 
Married Measured nominally as 1 = married, and 0 = not married 
Political Ideology Measured as a 7-point scale, with 0 = strongly liberal, and 6 = strongly conservative 
Age Measured in years. 
Education Measured in years of education. 
Party ID Measured as a 7-point scale, with 0 = strong Democrat, and 6 = strong Republican 
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